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ABSTRACT 
For well over a decade the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has 
been told that its framework for regulating traditional medical devices is not 
modern or flexible enough to address increasingly novel digital health 
technologies. Very recently, however, the FDA introduced a series of digital 
health initiatives that represent important experiments in medical product 
regulation, departing from longstanding precedents applied to therapeutic 
products like drugs and devices. The FDA will experiment with shifting its 
scrutiny from the pre-market to the post-market phase, shifting the locus of 
regulation from products to firms, and shifting from centralized government 
review to decentralized non-government review. This Article evaluates these new 
regulatory approaches, explains how they depart from previous approaches, and 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1970s, when the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) first 
encountered medical software, the agency has largely regulated software devices 
like more traditional, tangible medical devices. In the words of one expert back 
in 1986, FDA staff tended to treat medical software like “some kind of new 
bedpan.”1 But the FDA itself¾and everyone else¾has long suspected that 
software is different. For example, FDA staff in the 1980s were aware that 
software differed from traditional devices in terms of design, quality assurance, 
and user errors. The same observer above acknowledged that FDA staff, “people 
of immense goodwill,” were “wrestling” with these differences.2 
Finally, perhaps spurred by the ongoing revolution in digital health 
technologies, the FDA has started to experiment with a novel regulatory 
framework better tailored to software that qualify as medical “devices” subject to 
FDA jurisdiction. Referred to collectively as “digital health,” the products 
include mobile applications, clinical decision support (CDS) software, artificial 
intelligence (AI), and machine learning programs that perform some medical 
device function. The agency calls its plans an “entirely new” and “comprehensive 
approach to the regulation of digital health tools.”3 
This Article identifies and evaluates three important experiments with 
medical product regulation in the FDA’s new framework. First, the FDA 
proposes to shift its scrutiny from the pre-market phase to the post-market phase, 
with the idea of bringing technologies to market more quickly but giving 
increased scrutiny to “real world” data generated once a product is on the market. 
Second, the FDA proposes to shift the locus of regulation from products to firms, 
focusing its review on whether the firms that produce digital health devices 
engage in sufficient quality control, rather than its traditional product-centered 
approach. Third, the FDA also proposes to outsource some of these review 
functions to third-party certifiers, shifting from centralized government review to 
decentralized non-government review. This Article will evaluate these new 
regulatory approaches, explaining how they depart from previous approaches and 
why these innovations might be important. 
A swirl of activity has brought us to this point¾acts of Congress, guidance 
documents, public workshops, and inter-agency working groups and reports, 
 
 1. Information Technologies in the Health Care System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong. (1986) 
(statement of Vincent Brannigan). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Scott Gottlieb, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Fostering Medical Innovation: A Plan 
for Digital Health Devices (Jun. 15, 2017), available at https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/FDAVoices/ucm612019.htm. 
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culminating in the FDA’s 2017 Digital Health Innovation Action Plan. After 
years of pushing Congress and the agency to think creatively about digital health, 
we can now evaluate these experiments in light of the unique challenges of 
digital health oversight. 
I. EVERYTHING’S OLD! 
A. FDA’s Traditional Approach to Software Regulation 
For roughly 40 years, the FDA has regulated computerized medical devices 
under a framework established by the 1976 Medical Device Amendments.4 
Despite Congress’s longstanding interest in computerized medicine,5 it went 
decades without passing legislation to clarify the FDA’s role in reviewing 
dramatic new advances in medical computing.6 Thus, during a profound 
computer revolution, the FDA has been both blessed and cursed with significant 
discretion in how to adapt the 1976 statutory framework to computer hardware 
and software products. Eventually, of course, the health industry introduced new 
technologies that few could have imagined in 1976.7 Of course, all statutes age 
with time. But rapid technological advances in both computing and the 
biosciences only accelerated the aging process of the 1976 Medical Device 
Amendments. 
Despite being given wide latitude, the FDA’s interest in regulating software 
has been reluctant, until very recently. Indeed, the agency’s posture toward 
software has been halting and sporadic.8 It began in the 1970s, when the FDA 
approved applications for a certain computerized products, such as cardiac 
pacemaker programmers, patient monitors, and magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) machines.9 In the 1980s, FDA contemplated crafting more comprehensive 
rules, creating a Task Force on Computers and Software as Medical Devices in 
1981, and a Program Management Committee on Software and Computerized 
 
 4. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539, 94th Cong. (1976), codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 301 et seq. 
 5. See, e.g., Computers in Health Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and 
International Scientific Planning, Analysis, and Cooperation of the H. Comm. on Science and 
Technology, 95th Cong. (1978); Health Information Systems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Science, Research, and Technology and Subcomm. on Natural Resources, Agricultural Research, 
and Environment of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong. (1981); see also Nathan 
Cortez, Analogy Agency in a Digital World, in FDA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE 
CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 438, 442-43 (2015). 
 6. Cortez, Analog Agency, supra note 5, at 442-43. 
 7. See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1173 
(2014). 
 8. Cortez, Analog Agency, supra note 5, at 443-47. 
 9. Information Technologies in the Health Care System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong. (1986). 
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Devices in 1984.10 The decade culminated with FDA publishing a Draft Policy 
for the Regulation of Computer Products in 1987 and then an update in 1989.11 
In the 1990s, the FDA again hinted that it was considering comprehensive 
rules tailored to software devices, but never proposed them.12 In 2005, the FDA 
unceremoniously withdrew its 1989 Draft Policy without comment.13 In 2011, 
the agency explained that it had never published an “overarching software 
policy” because “the use of computer and software products grew exponentially 
and the types of products diversified and grew more complex.”14 Thus, as the 
technology raced forward, the FDA moved very little¾insisting that the 1976 
device framework could be adapted to software devices. 
This tailoring happened through the FDA’s relatively narrow, piecemeal 
rulemaking, product reviews, and publication of guidance. Together, these 
discrete acts gradually articulated the FDA’s expectations for software devices. 
For example, Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations includes dozens of 
sections that reference software, though the vast majority refer to specific device 
classifications;15 few establish broad rules for software devices.16 Software is 
given specific attention in the Quality Systems Regulation (QSR) and in rules for 
radiology products.17 Otherwise, FDA regulations establish almost no broadly 
applicable, binding rules for software devices distinct from non-software 
devices.18 
Without decisive rules, most of the FDA’s action on software has been in 
individual product reviews and guidance. For example, the agency has cleared 
numerous software devices through its 510(k) notification process, which 
declares that a product is “substantially equivalent” to a predicate device already 
on the market.19 The agency has cleared hundreds of digital health products, but 
has been criticized for declaring that novel digital and mobile technologies are 
substantially equivalent to older devices that were introduced well before 
smartphones even existed.20 The FDA can also clear products that are not 
 
 10. Cortez, Analog Agency, supra note 5, at 444. 
 11. 52 Fed. Reg. 36104 (Sep. 25, 1987); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT POLICY FOR THE 
REGULATION OF COMPUTER PRODUCTS (Nov. 13, 1989), available at 1989 WL 1178702. 
 12. Cortez, Analog Agency, supra note 5, at 443-44. 
 13. 70 Fed. Reg. 824, 890 (Jan. 5, 2005). 
 14. U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and 
Drug Administration Staff; Mobile Medical Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43689 (Jul. 21, 2011). 
 15. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. parts 862-92. 
 16. Cortez, Analog Agency, supra note 5, at 445. 
 17. See, 21 C.F.R. parts 1000-1050, 820. 
 18. Cortez, Analog Agency, supra note 5, at 445. 
 19. FDCA § 510(k); 21 U.S.C. § 360(k). 
 20. See, e.g., Cortez et al., FDA Regulation of Mobile Health Technologies, 371 NEW. ENG. J. 
MED. 372, 375 (2014). 
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substantially equivalent to a predicate through a de novo classification under 
section 513 of the Act.21 For example, in September 2018 the FDA granted 
Apple’s request for de novo classification of an electrocardiogram (ECG) 
software application on the Apple Watch that can detect atrial fibrillation and 
other arrhythmias.22 
The most striking feature of the FDA’s traditional approach to software is its 
heavy reliance on nonbinding guidance. For example, the agency addresses 
premarket submissions, software design controls, cyber security, and a host of 
other topics on software devices through twenty-six guidance documents.23 These 
guidances are supplemented by dozens more that assign “special controls” to 
Class II, so-called “moderate risk” devices (Class I are “low risk” while Class III 
are “high risk”).24 Moreover, the FDA’s own guidances are built on a scaffolding 
of even more nonbinding guidances published by standard-setting groups like the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).25 
Thus, the story of the FDA’s traditional approach to software is one of the 
agency clarifying how a regulatory framework established in 1976 applies to 
devices of ever-increasing novelty, complexity, and sophistication. 
B. Updating for Digital Health 
The FDA began articulating regulatory expectations for digital health 
products in 2011, when it published a Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical 
Applications.26 That same year, FDA down-classified a related but relatively 
mundane category of software, known as “medical device data systems,” from 
Class III to Class I.27 (Typically, high-risk Class III devices require pre-market 
 
 21. FDCA § 513; 21 U.S.C. § 360c. 
 22. Letter to Donna-Bea Tillman and Apple, Inc. from Angela C. Krueger, Center for 
Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), U.S. Food and Drug Admin. (FDA) of Sep. 11, 2018, 
available at https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf18/DEN180044.pdf. 
 23. Cortez, Analog Agency, supra note 5, at 446-47 (finding 26 separate guidance 
documents¾including 15 original and 11 updated versions¾published by FDA on software 
devices as of 2015). In 2018, undoubtedly, there are many more, although this author has not 
updated this accounting. However, the FDA does helpfully include a link to all “Guidances with 
digital health content.” FDA, Guidances with Digital Health Content (Mar. 8, 2018), at 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/ucm562577.htm. 
 24. Id. at 447. 
 25. Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 7, at 1223. 
 26. U.S. Food and Drug Admin. (FDA), Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug 
Administration Staff; Mobile Medical Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43689 (Jul. 21, 2011) (hereinafter 
“MMA Draft Guidance”). 
 27. This down-classification focused on medical device data systems (MDDS), which 
transfer, store, or convert device data, or display device data, without controlling medical devices 
themselves. The agency re-classified such devices from Class III to Class I. See FDA, Medical 
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approval (PMA) applications be approved by FDA, while low-risk Class I 
devices can enter the market through mere 510(k) notifications, unless they are 
exempt.) The 2011 MMA Draft Guidance represented a major statement on the 
FDA’s interest in digital health. The document was a rather rudimentary primer 
on which digital health products might fall under FDA jurisdiction and which 
ones might not.28 From the beginning, the agency has declined to exercise 
jurisdiction over low-risk digital health products like health trackers or programs 
that merely provide generalized medical information. Instead, the MMA Draft 
Guidance said the FDA’s risk-based approach would focus on digital health 
products that offered “patient-specific analysis and . . . patient-specific diagnosis, 
or treatment recommendations.”29 The MMA Draft Guidance received significant 
attention from the tech industry,30 which understood the importance of a federal 
agency like the FDA announcing its focused attention on digital health, even if 
most signals pointed to a quite sympathetic regulator.31 In 2013, FDA finalized 
the guidance based on public workshops and other feedback.32 
Meanwhile, just as the FDA contemplated how to adapt its relatively old 
regulatory framework to relatively novel digital health technologies, Congress 
began pushing regulators to consider new frameworks. In 2012, Congress passed 
the FDA Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), which called for the FDA, the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Office of National 
Coordinator for Health IT (ONC) to recommend a “risk-based regulatory 
framework” for health IT products, including mobile and digital devices.33 The 
resulting report, published in 2014, called for the FDA to maintain its rather 
circumscribed approach to health IT products and regulate only a very limited 
subset.34 Although the report recommended that the ONC create a new Health IT 
Safety Center focused on quality control, the Center would have functioned 
mostly to centralize expertise and best practices rather than serve as a traditional 
regulator capable of enforcing requirements.35 
 
Devices; Medical Device Data Systems, 76 Fed. Reg. 8637 (Feb. 15, 2011). 
 28. See MMA Draft Guidance, at supra note 26. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., Brian Dolan, FDA Drafts Mobile Medical App Regulations, MOBIHEALTHNEWS 
(Jul. 19, 2011), at https://www.mobihealthnews.com/11970/fda-drafts-mobile-medical-app-
regulations. 
 31. Nathan Cortez, The FDA Needs to Regulate “Digital Snake Oil,” SLATE.COM (Sep. 24, 
2013), at https://bit.ly/2xQo2EJ. 
 32. FDA, Mobile Medical Applications; Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug 
Administration Staff, 78 Fed. Reg. 59038 (Sep. 25, 2013). 
 33. Pub. L. No. 112-144 § 618, 112th Cong. 2012, 126 Stat. 993, 1063. 
 34. FDASIA HEALTH IT REPORT (Apr. 2014), at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM391521.pdf. 
 35. Id. at 14-16; Nathan G. Cortez, I. Glenn Cohen, & Aaron S. Kesselheim, FDA Regulation 
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Furthermore, between 2012 and 2014, Congress considered a series of bills 
that sponsors hoped would better guide both the FDA and the digital health 
industry.36 Finally, in 2016, at the twilight of the Obama administration, 
Congress passed the 21st Century Cures Act,37 perhaps most well-known for 
relaxing drug approval standards.38 The Cures Act included a section titled 
“Clarifying Medical Software Regulation.”39 But rather than modernize the 
FDA’s framework for regulating software devices in light of the nascent digital 
health revolution, Congress merely tried to clarify FDA jurisdiction over 
software. For example, the Cures Act added new section 360j(o) to the federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), clarifying that “devices” subject to FDA 
jurisdiction would exclude “health software,” or programs used for 
administrative, lifestyle, or patient record purposes.40 Such “health software” 
would also include some clinical decision support (CDS) software¾though the 
line between CDS subject to FDA jurisdiction and CDS outside it remains 
murky, as it has for decades.41 
Elsewhere, the Cures Act sent important signals to the FDA. First, 
notwithstanding the statutory carve-out for “health software,” the Act gives FDA 
discretion to regulate software that it finds to be “reasonably likely to have 
serious adverse health consequences.”42 Second, Congress reminded the FDA to 
impose the “least burdensome” requirements in reviewing premarket 
submissions,43 echoing earlier calls from Congress,44 and even the agency’s own 
early statements on software some 30 years earlier.45 
Despite these efforts by Congress and the FDA, observers continued to note 
 
of Mobile Health Technologies, 371 N. ENG. J. MED. 372, 377 (2014). 
 36. Cortez et al., FDA Regulation of Mobile Health Technologies, supra note 20, at 375-76 
(describing proposed legislation). 
 37. Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 3060, 130 Stat. 1033, 1130, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 38. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, New “21st Century Cures” Legislation: Speed and 
Ease vs. Science, 317 JAMA 581 (2017). 
 39. Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 3060. 
 40. Id. (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)). 
 41. A long-time critic of the FDA’s unclear position on CDS is Brad Thompson from Epstein 
Becker Green, who created the CDS Coalition to focus on drawing the appropriate line between 
regulated and non-regulated CDS products. See CDS Coalition, About Us, at 
http://cdscoalition.org/about-us/. 
 42. Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 3060(a), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(3)(A)(i). 
 43. Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 3058. 
 44. See, e.g., Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 105-
115, 105th Cong. § 513 (1997) (calling for the FDA to consider the “least burdensome” ways to 
evaluate device effectiveness and substantial equivalence). 
 45. 1986 Hearing, supra note 1 (promising to impose “the minimum level of regulatory 
control necessary” on software). See also Nathan Cortez, Analogy Agency in a Digital World, in 
FDA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES 438, 450 (2015). 
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the disconnect between an increasingly dated regulatory framework and the 
increasingly sophisticated digital health technologies being introduced to the U.S. 
market.46 A collective notion began to emerge that digital health required 
something new. Indeed, Scott Gottlieb, writing before he became FDA 
Commissioner in 2017, critiqued the FDA’s approach to digital health products 
in Forbes (“Why Apple Dumbs Down Your Smartphone”) and The Wall Street 
Journal (“Why Your Phone Isn’t as Smart as It Could Be”), arguing that fear of, 
and uncertainty over, potential FDA regulation stifled innovation.47 The FDA, in 
its own words, has repeated the notion that the 1976 device framework “is not 
well suited for software-based technologies.”48 
Meanwhile, some in the digital health industry grew frustrated with lingering 
confusion over the boundaries of FDA jurisdiction. Indeed, the FDA estimated 
that it had responded to over 900 inquiries since 2013 about its policies for digital 
health.49 Some developers seemed deterred by potential FDA oversight of their 
products. Less scrupulous developers tried to avoid FDA oversight with 
disclaimers that their products were merely “recreational” or “informational” and 
thus did not aim to diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent diseases or other 
conditions.50 More serious developers submitted premarket notifications for FDA 
review, but grew impatient with what they saw as protracted FDA review cycles, 
particularly as compared to relatively short product life cycles.51 Meanwhile, 
 
 46. See, e.g., Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 7; Cortez et al., FDA 
Regulation of Mobile Health Technologies, supra note 20; Nicolas P. Terry, Mobile Health: 
Assessing the Barriers, 147 CHEST 1429 (2015); W. Nicholson Price, Black Box Medicine, 28 
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 419, 457-62 (2015); Fazal Khan, The “Uberization” of Healthcare: The 
Forthcoming Legal Storm over Mobile Health Technology’s Impact on the Medical Profession, 26 
HEALTH MATRIX 123 (2016); W. Nicholson Price, Regulating Black Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. 
REV. 421 (2017); Rachel E. Sachs, Mobile Health Innovation and Interagency Coordination, 26 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 1 (2017); Nathan Cortez, Substantiating Big Data in Health Care, 14 I/S: A 
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 61 (2017); Efthimios Parasidis, 
Clinical Decision Support: Elements of a Sensible Legal Framework, 20 J. OF HEALTH CARE L. & 
POL’Y 183 (2018). 
 47. Scott Gottlieb, Why Apple Dumbs Down Your Smartphone, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2015), at 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottgottlieb/2015/12/04/why-apple-dumbs-down-your-smartphone/; 
Scott Gottlie & Coleen Klasmeier, Why Your Phone Isn’t as Smart as It Could Be, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 7, 2014), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/scott-gottlieb-and-coleen-klasmeier-why-your-
phone-isnt-as-smart-as-it-could-be-1407369163. 
 48. Jeffrey Shuren, Bakul Patel, & Scott Gottlieb, FDA Regulation of Mobile Medical Apps, 
JAMA E1 (Jul. 2, 2018); FDA, Developing a Software Precertification Program: A Working Model 
v0.1 (Apr. 2018), at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/
DigitalHealthPreCertProgram/ucm605685.pdf. 
 49. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Digital Health Innovation Action Plan at 3 n.4 (June 
2017), at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/UCM568735.pdf. 
 50. See, e.g., Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 7, at 1187-88. 
 51. Nathan G. Cortez, Nicolas P. Terry, & I. Glenn Cohen, Questions About the FDA’s New 
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attorneys and consultants openly advised the industry “How to Avoid FDA 
Regulation of Your Mobile Medical App.”52 
Moreover, the users of digital health¾patients, physicians, and others¾still 
lack reliable guarantees that the products on the market do what they claim. The 
sheer volume and variety of digital health products make it daunting for users to 
select reliable products from among dozens or perhaps even hundreds of options. 
Even physicians, nurses, and others with medical training struggle to evaluate the 
flood of digital health products.53 Although the FDA has cleared well over 100 
mobile health products through its 510(k) process as of 2016,54 there were 
roughly 165,000 health-related programs available for Apple and Android 
devices that same year, with 1.7 billion downloads estimated for 2017.55 
The void left by lax FDA premarket oversight has been filled to various 
degrees. For example, the FTC has brought some high-profile enforcement 
actions against digital health products claiming to treat ADHD in pediatric 
populations, detect melanomas, measure blood pressure, or improve vision¾all 
without sufficient scientific support.56 Alternative methods of screening are being 
performed by (i) venture capital firms that are sophisticated in the biosciences, 
which may pass on investments without data supporting their claims, (ii) 
hospitals creating guidelines for users and developers, which establish ground 
rules for selecting reliable products, (iii) third-party app review web sites, many 
of which try to review the evidence base supporting a product, and (iv) health 
insurers establishing coverage policies, which determine the technologies that 
warrant reimbursement.57 I call these “surrogate” or “proxy” forms of regulation 
of digital health¾less centralized alternatives that have emerged in the absence 
of robust FDA oversight.58 Each has obvious shortcomings. None can replace 
meaningful FDA premarket review. 
In summary, the legal and regulatory landscape is shifting during what 
 
Framework for Digital Health, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 16, 2017), at 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170816.061554/full/. 
 52. Keith Barritt, How to Avoid FDA Regulation of Your Mobile Medical App, Med. Device 
Online (Jul. 7, 2015). 
 53. Nathan Cortez, The Evolving Law and Ethics of Digital Health, in DIGITAL HEALTH: 
SCALING HEALTHCARE TO THE WORLD 249, 262 (Homero Rivas & Katarzyna Wac, eds. 2018) 
 54. See, FDA, Examples of Pre-Market Submissions that Include MMAs Cleared or 
Approved by FDA, at https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/
MobileMedicalApplications/ucm368784.htm. 
 55. Research 2 Guidance, Global Mobile Health Market Report 2013-2017 (Mar. 2013), at 
https://research2guidance.com/the-market-for-mhealth-app-services-will-reach-26-billion-by-
2017/. 
 56. Cortez, Substantiating Big Data in Health Care, supra note 46, at 74. 
 57. Nathan Cortez, The Evolving Law and Ethics of Digital Health, in DIGITAL HEALTH: 
SCALING HEALTHCARE TO THE WORLD 249 (Homero Rivas & Katarzyna Wac, eds. 2018). 
 58. Id. at 262. 
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seems to be a pivotal moment for digital health. Recent high-profile stumbles by 
companies like 23andMe and Theranos should remind us that medical 
technologies require more substantiation and evidence base than other products 
and services.59 Thus, the lingering challenge remains: What evidence do we 
require when digital health products hit the market? And when should such 
evidence be due¾before or after market entry? The FDA, responding to calls to 
create a more tailored approach, is offering some novel alternatives, which I turn 
to next. 
II. EVERYTHING’S NEW! THREE EXPERIMENTS IN  
MEDICAL PRODUCT REGULATION 
In 2017, the FDA announced its Digital Health Innovation Action Plan,60 
declaring that the agency was “reimagining its approach to digital health medical 
devices”61 and introducing an “entirely new” and “comprehensive approach.”62 
The agency itself acknowledged that its new approach was animated by the 
disconnect between an aging regulatory framework and increasingly novel 
devices: “FDA’s traditional approach to moderate and higher risk hardware-
based medical devices is not well suited for faster iterative design, development, 
and type of validation used for software-based medical technologies.”63 
The Digital Health Innovation Action Plan introduces three important 
experiments in medical product regulation for the FDA. First, the agency is 
shifting its focus from pre-market to post-market evidence gathering. Second, the 
agency is shifting from product-level reviews to firm-level reviews. And third, 
the agency is shifting from governmental to non-governmental decisionmakers as 
it introduces the new Software Precertification Program. Each represents a 
 
 59. See, e.g., Cortez, Substantiating Big Data in Health Care, supra note 46; JOHN 
CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY STARTUP (2018) (detailing how 
Theranos repeatedly attempted to mislead investors, inspectors from the FDA and CMS, and even 
its own employees about the capabilities of its blood-testing products); Warning Letter from James 
L. Woods, FDA Office of In vitro Diagnostics and Radiological Health to Ann Wojcicki of 
23andMe, Inc. of Nov. 22, 2013, available at https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/
WarningLetters/2013/ucm376296.htm (detailing how 23andMe was marketing its direct-to-
consumer genetic testing products without FDA approval or clearance as medical devices). 
 60. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Digital Health Innovation Action Plan (June 2017), 
at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/UCM568735.pdf. 
 61. Id. at 5. 
 62. Scott Gottlieb, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Fostering Medical Innovation: A Plan 
for Digital Health Devices (Jun. 15, 2017), at https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
FDAVoices/ucm612019.htm; Scott Gottlieb, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, FDA Announces 
New Steps to Empower Consumers and Advance Digital Healthcare (Jul. 27, 2017), at 
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/FDAVoices/ucm612014.htm. 
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significant departure from the FDA’s longstanding approach to regulating 
medical products, which for decades has centered on pre-market evaluation of 
evidence for a specific product, performed by the agency itself. Thus, the new 
framework is a bold departure from the FDA’s historical role as a gatekeeper for 
medical products.64 And, arguably, there is not clear statutory authority for these 
shifts in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), even as amended by recent 
bills like FDASIA and the 21st Century Cures Act.65 Although these experiments 
certainly are welcome, they should be evaluated by their ability to generate 
reliable evidence of safety and efficacy, and their ability to facilitate high-quality 
innovation and deter low-quality innovation in the digital health industry.66 
A. Pre-Market to Post-Market 
The FDA’s first experiment with digital health is what the agency calls a 
“novel” shift from pre-market to post-market oversight.67 FDA will exempt 
“lower risk” digital health devices from pre-market review altogether, and then 
streamline reviews for “higher risk” digital health products offered by 
precertified firms. The FDA also has floated the idea of using “phased” or 
“preliminary” market authorization by which it would review some elements 
premarket and others post.68 Software products offered by precertified companies 
either will receive streamlined FDA review or no review at all, depending on: (i) 
the risk presented, from non-serious, to serious, to critical; (ii) the significance of 
the information generated to health care decision decisionmaking, from merely 
informing clinical management, to driving such management, to outright treating 
or diagnosing directly; and (iii) the nature of the introduction, from minor 
changes, to major changes, to initial introduction of the product.69 Thus, the FDA 
 
 64. See, e.g., DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 544-584 (2010) (describing this dynamic with regard 
to pharmaceuticals). 
 65. Recently, several Senators also made this argument. See Letter from Sen. Elizabeth 
Warren, Sen. Patty Murray, & Sen. Tina Smith to Scott Gottlieb, FDA Commissioner, and Jeffrey 
Shuren, Director of the FDA Center for Devices and Radiological Health of Oct. 10, 2018 (pp. 3-
4). 
 66. Cortez et al., FDA Regulation of Mobile Health Technologies, supra note 20; Price, 
Regulating Black Box Medicine, supra note 46, at 455; Parasidis, supra note 46, at 193. 
 67. Gottlieb, Fostering Medical Innovation, supra note 62. 
 68. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Challenge Questions, at 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/DigitalHealthPreCertProgram/ucm
605686.pdf. As the Senators point out in their letter, supra note 65, “the FDA has stated that 
conditional approval¾a regulatory pathway for certain animal drugs that allows these products to 
be legally marketed for a period of time . . . while the company continues to collect efficacy 
data¾is not appropriate for human medical products, including SaMDs [Software as a Medical 
Device].” 
 69. FDA, Developing a Software Precertification Program, supra note 48, at 10. 
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proposes to shift its attention away from premarket evaluation of evidence to 
post-market evaluation of evidence, a marked departure for the agency. 
Moreover, in line with the 21st Century Cures Act, the FDA will rely on 
“post-market collection of real-world data” to review new functions for digital 
health products already on the market. This effort will rely on data from the 
National Evaluation System for Health Technology (NEST), an FDA-led effort 
to collect “real-world evidence” across a product’s entire life cycle and evaluate 
it using “advanced analytics.”70 NEST was originally envisioned as a tool for 
post-market surveillance, but is being utilized to support the FDA’s “pre- and 
postmarket regulatory decisions.”71 For example, the agency envisions that real-
world evidence gathered by NEST could be used to support petitions for 
reclassification under section 513 of the Act.72 The shift from pre- to post-market 
oversight and evidence collection accommodates the short lifecycles and 
relatively low risk profiles of many digital health technologies. 
Nevertheless, this is an important departure from longstanding FDA 
precedent and should be evaluated as an experiment. Will this new framework 
generate reliable data? How many products that turn out not to be as safe and 
effective as preliminary evidence suggested will be removed from the market? 
How much will the new framework change developer incentives to generate 
reliable data regarding safety and efficacy? Will post-market data expectations be 
enforced? One could imagine a world in which these questions are answered 
satisfactorily. But one could just as easily imagine a world in which they aren’t. 
What happens then? 
B. Product to Firm 
Second, the FDA is experimenting with firm-level review in lieu of product-
level review through a new Software Precertification Pilot Program. Companies 
that are “pre-certified” will enjoy a quicker pathway to market for their products. 
The FDA explains that precertification will “provide more streamlined and 
efficient regulatory oversight of software-based medical devices developed by 
manufacturers who have demonstrated a robust culture of quality and 
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 71. FDA, National Evaluation System for Health Technology (NEST), at 
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organizational excellence, and who are committed to monitoring real-world 
performance of their products once they reach the U.S. market.”73 The goal is to 
reward precertified companies by giving their products “a streamlined, less-
burdensome” premarket review process or allowing them to bypass it 
altogether.74 The pilot will first apply to software as a medical device (SaMD), 
then perhaps to software in a medical device (SiMD).75 Precertification will be 
granted to companies that satisfy five criteria: patient safety, product quality, 
clinical responsibility, cyber security responsibility, and proactive culture.76 In 
September 2017, the FDA selected nine companies for the Precertification Pilot: 
Apple; Fitbit; Johnson & Johnson; Pear Therapeutics; Phosphorus; Roche; 
Samsung; Tidepool; and Verily.77 During the pilot, the agency is soliciting public 
comments on its design and performance.78 
Streamlined review for the products of precertified companies would depend 
on data already submitted to the agency as part of the precertification process, as 
well as additional information about “product performance, clinical association 
between [product] output and a clinical condition, and safety measures.”79 The 
agency and company would then continue to collect “real-world performance 
data,” including user experience, software performance information, and clinical 
outcomes¾gathered post-market.80 
Of course, at the time of this writing, important details remain in flux. An 
early model of the precertification program proposed by the FDA would allow 
even moderate- or high-risk devices offered by precertified companies to be 
eligible for streamlined review.81 The FDA also seems to be contemplating 
expanding eligibility for precertification to all companies, not just the ones with 
prior experience marketing medical devices in the United States, as suggested 
earlier by the agency.82 The details here are important¾how much of a shift from 
product- to firm-level scrutiny will occur. And how much of a privileged or 
elevated position will precertified firms enjoy? Will precertification status ever 
be meaningfully reevaluated or revoked? 
 
 73. FDA, Digital Health Software Precertification (Pre-Cert) Program, at 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/UCM567265. 
 74. FDA, Fostering Medical Innovation: A Plan for Digital Health Devices; Software 
Precertification Pilot Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 35216 (Jul. 28, 2017). 
 75. Id. 
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2018), 13 (June 2018), available at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/
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On a related front, the FDA also promises a “new approach to the review of 
artificial intelligence,” applying pre-certification to AI so that certain certified 
companies can make “minor changes to [their] devices without having to make 
submissions each time.” Indeed, in April 2019, FDA published its Proposed 
Regulatory Framework for Modifications to Artificial Intelligence/Machine 
Learning-Based Software as a Medical Device, seeking public feedback.83 
Again, a shift from product- to firm-level review is relatively uncharted 
territory for the agency. The experiment will test whether firm-level 
characteristics such as company culture, in-house expertise, and experience can 
better predict product reliability and performance than product-level 
characteristics that are typically the focus of FDA reviews. This is a worthwhile 
experiment, so long as it is evaluated critically as an experiment. 
C. Government to Non-Government 
Third, the FDA is experimenting with reviews by independent, non-
governmental certifiers. A longstanding observation is that the FDA historically 
has lacked the internal expertise and resources to give in-depth reviews to 
sophisticated medical software.84 An early expert on medical device software 
observed in 1986 that “even in the best of faith, with the best of will, the best of 
technology, the best of intentions,” the FDA could not adequately regulate 
software based on the 1976 Device Amendments.85 Although the agency has 
made significant advances on this front, it is still overwhelmed by the volume 
and variety of digital health technologies. 
In this spirit, the FDA has created a new Digital Health Unit,86 as well as a 
new program called “Information Exchange and Data Transformation” 
(INFORMED), which will conduct regulatory science research to support the 
FDA’s new initiatives.87 The program will rely on the “software as a medical 
device” (SaMD) framework developed through the FDA’s work with the 
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International Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF), an international 
consortium of device regulators. Thus, even as the FDA continues to build its 
internal capacities on digital health, it will nevertheless experiment with 
outsourcing to third-party certifiers. As a result, new digital health devices could 
be introduced to market “without FDA ever reviewing either the medical device 
software developed by a company or the company itself.”88 
The use of non-FDA certifiers is a genuine innovation at the agency 
(although, to be fair, the FDA relies on advisory panels and the like for new drug 
reviews). But it is not an innovation outside the agency. Numerous other federal 
programs rely on third-party certifications or appraisals. A well-known example 
in the health industry is hospital accreditation by the Joint Commission. The 
Medicare statute provides that any hospital accredited by the Joint Commission is 
“deemed” to comply with Medicare’s extensive “conditions of participation.”89 
In early documents, the FDA describes its third-party precertification process as 
involving four steps: (i) an initial application; (ii) an appraisal by the third-party 
certifier; (iii) a determination by the FDA; and (iv) maintenance of the 
certification through “automated and manual analysis” of continued compliance 
with the standards.90 This process roughly follows the application-appraisal-
determination process used by the Joint Commission. The FDA explains that 
maintaining precertification status will involve automated review of “objective 
evidence” made available to the FDA.91 Automated review itself raises a host of 
questions, although again these features remain in flux during the pilot program. 
IV. EVALUATING THE EXPERIMENT 
The FDA’s experiments with digital health are really experiments in medical 
product regulation, itself a form of risk regulation. Drugs, devices, and biologics 
do not enter the U.S. market without a determination¾direct or indirect¾that 
their benefits outweigh their risks. For decades, the lodestar of medical product 
regulation has been premarket review, with the FDA serving as an expert 
gatekeeper evaluating clinical data to determine whether products are safe and 
effective for their intended uses.92 Even for medical devices, 99% of which are 
cleared through the 510(k) notification process rather than being approved 
through the premarket approval (PMA) process,93 the FDA plays a gatekeeping 
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role: determinations of “substantial equivalence” that are key to the 510(k) 
process often depend on subsidiary questions that touch on the product’s 
underlying ratio of benefits to risks. 
Now, this gatekeeping function has been relaxed for digital health products. 
This part thus identifies a series of important questions we should consider as 
these experiments move forward. 
A. Evidence and Incentives? 
A core feature of FDA regulation of medical products is its gatekeeping 
authority over market entry.94 The government’s leverage in this scheme 
encourages companies to produce more and better information about their 
products than they otherwise would absent FDA premarket review. Thus, when 
evaluating the FDA’s new approach to digital health, we should consider the 
extent to which it alters manufacturer incentives to generate reliable data 
regarding the safety and efficacy of their products. How will the new system 
compare to the existing 510(k) system (which itself has been criticized for 
generating insufficient data)? When should such data be generated¾before 
market introduction or after? And what types of data should we expect? 
Now might be the time to consider appropriate standards for demonstrating 
efficacy in digital health products, particularly those that rely on predictive 
analytics. For example, the FDA should encourage developers to identify 
clinically-relevant endpoints that can help demonstrate a product’s clinical 
benefit.95 Although measurements like overall survival might prove difficult for 
digital health products, other surrogate endpoints might correspond to meaningful 
clinical benefits, provided they are subject to rigorous validation.96 Moreover, the 
FDA should consider current clinical practices as a valid benchmark¾is the 
digital health product inferior when compared to clinician performance?97 We 
should not necessarily expect digital health products to be perfect, or even 
obviously superior to clinicians, but at the very least they should not be inferior.98 
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Given the proposed shift from pre-market to post-market review, the users 
and payers that rely on digital health products introduced under the new system 
may still lack reliable evidence that the products work as intended. Of course, 
compared to the current system in which very few digital health products either 
seek or obtain 510(k) clearance, that is undoubtedly already the case. 
Nevertheless, the concern is that over the long term, the lack of reliable evidence 
may depress demand and thus adoption of digital health products.99 The fact that 
Apple and other well-known companies introduce products may spur adoption. 
But what of less familiar firms? 
Consumer trust¾or the lack thereof¾is an important question for the digital 
health industry.100 Users can easily be overwhelmed by the sheer volume and 
variety of digital health tools on the market, and even licensed practitioners will 
find it daunting to evaluate the benefits and risks of dozens (if not hundreds) of 
options. Thus, the FDA posits that its new “efficient regulation” of digital health 
products, particularly its precertification program, “can increase consumer 
confidence” in these technologies and “help patients, payers, and investors better 
understand” the products, thereby inducing a “race to the top” among 
developers.101 In an early document describing the agency’s precertification 
program, FDA says the program “is intended to drive market competition to 
higher standards of safety and effectiveness.”102 But it is not at all clear why the 
FDA’s precertification program will encourage a “race to the top.” It may 
encourage a race to precertify, for sure. But can we call precertification “the 
top”? 
It depends. One method that might pair well with the new post-market 
approach is a mandatory reevaluation period at some specified interval¾such as 
two or three years¾as some foreign jurisdictions have contemplated.103 
Mandatory post-market reviews would preserve incentives to generate data 
regarding product performance. Weak incentives may undermine the delicate 
balance between pre- and post-market oversight that the new digital health 
approach aspires to achieve. The new precertification process is based on the idea 
that the FDA should trust certain manufacturers but verify performance,104 
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recalling President Reagan’s “trust-but-verify” approach to Soviet nuclear 
disarmament.105 But how rigorous will the “verify” step be? And if the 
verification process reveals shortcomings, what then? There should be real 
consequences, including de-certification and market withdrawals. 
B. New Governance: Theory vs. Reality? 
Long ago regulatory theorists became enamored with “new governance,” a 
set of alternative regulatory approaches that reject traditional command-and-
control regulation, particularly its reliance on formal sanctions, in favor of more 
cooperative, decentralized, “soft law” approaches.106 Advantages are supposed to 
include greater flexibility, transparency, responsiveness, cost-effectiveness, and 
even higher levels of compliance.107 The FDA’s digital health experiments all 
sound in new governance. 
But it remains to be seen whether and how the FDA may use traditional 
enforcement tools to buttress its more friendly, flexible approach to digital 
health. The voluminous literature on “new governance” once promised that more 
cooperative, flexible regulation would achieve better outcomes than more 
traditional, centralized regulation and enforcement.108 But some of the gloss has 
worn off. Indeed, after the recent Boeing recall of its 737 Max aircraft, critics 
highlighted how the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had allowed Boeing 
to self-test and self-certify its new plane design and flight software.109 
Thus, the experiment with third-party precertification must win over skeptics 
that question its effectiveness. To cite a relevant example closer to home, the 
federal Office of National Coordinator for Health Information Technology 
(ONC) used a similar third-party certification process for determining whether 
electronic health records (EHR) met federal “meaningful use” requirements, but 
it produced underwhelming results.110 Similarly, an early effort by a third-party 
certifier called “Happtique,” designed to certify that mobile health applications 
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met certain privacy standards, was suspended after a researcher found blatant 
security lapses among programs that had been certified.111 And, of course, in the 
broader health care sphere, third-party accreditors like the Joint Commission, 
which is responsible for accrediting hospitals for the Medicare program, have 
been criticized for rarely denying applications for accreditation and virtually 
never revoking them.112 
This is not to say that third-party certification is necessarily doomed. Rather, 
the point is that it succeeds only with meaningful monitoring and enforcement. 
So-called “soft law” approaches, ironically, may only work well if reinforced 
with more traditional “hard law” backstops. 
C. Clinical Decision Support? 
Another important question that remains unanswered after decades of 
congressional acts and FDA guidance documents is how the FDA will treat 
clinical decision support (CDS) software. On one hand, the Cures Act exempts 
from FDA regulation “health software,” including most CDS programs. On the 
other hand, it authorizes FDA to regulate health software if the agency finds that 
it “would reasonably be likely to have serious adverse health consequences.”113 
In making this finding, Congress directs the FDA to consider four factors: (i) the 
likelihood and severity of patient harm; (ii) the extent to which the software is 
intended to support the clinical judgment of a health professional; (iii) whether 
the health professional has a “reasonable opportunity . . . to review the basis” of 
the recommendation; and (iv) the intended user and environment.114 
In a 2017 guidance, FDA explained that it will evaluate the third 
factor¾whether health professionals have a “reasonable opportunity to review 
the basis” of software recommendations¾based on how clearly the software 
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explains: (i) the purpose or intended use of the software; (ii) the intended user 
(e.g., ultrasound technicians, vascular surgeons); (iii) the inputs used to generate 
the recommendation; and (iv) the rationale or support for the recommendation.115 
Thus, decision support software will not be regulated as medical devices if they 
intended user is “able to reach the same recommendation on his or her own 
without relying primarily on the software . . . “116 The sources and inputs 
informing the recommendation, then, must be public and understandable to the 
intended user.117 
These criteria resurrect a notion from the FDA’s 1987 Draft Software 
Guidance regarding “competent human intervention.”118 The 1987 guidance 
explained that FDA would exempt from regulation any artificial intelligence or 
decision support software that allowed ample time for “competent human 
intervention,” meaning time during which “clinical judgment and experience can 
be used to check and interpret a system’s output” before “any impact on human 
health.”119 Thus, the FDA asserted jurisdiction over decision support software 
that is opaque and used in circumstances where there is little opportunity for 
independently evaluating options. So software directing a nurse to “Inject Dose 
Now!” would be subject to regulation, while software recommending injections 
at specific intervals well in advance, with the opportunity for nurses to consider 
the appropriateness of those intervals, would not be subject to regulation.120 
Thus, the idea of drawing lines between decisionmaking that is primarily 
driven by automation and driven by professional judgment is an old one. But 
studies of human-computer interaction (HCI) show that we are dangerously 
predisposed to trust automated advice, even if we have the opportunity and 
reasons to question it.121 So-called “automation bias” leads us to believe that 
automated advice is resistant to errors or infallible, even when presented with 
reasons to believe otherwise.122 Indeed, automation bias remains a problem in 
aviation safety, a lesson we should heed in medicine.123 Thus, in practice users 
are likely to trust automated advice without question, even if there is time for 
competent human intervention. Humans are busy and fallible, and we are likely 
to outsource decisionmaking to automation if the option is available. 
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These considerations deserve much more attention than they have received 
in the 21st Century Cures Act or in the FDA’s many guidances to date. The FDA 
has taken a thoughtful approach, to be sure. And drawing the line between CDS 
that should and should not be regulated is a difficult task, to be sure. But 
important questions remain. 
D. Statutory Authority? 
Finally, the FDA’s bold experiments with digital health do not find clear 
support in the statute, even after the 21st Century Cures Act. For example, an 
earlier version of the Cures Act authorized the FDA to craft a new regulatory 
framework, but the final bill omitted the provision.124 The Cures Act that passed 
included more modest provisions defining “health software” as falling outside the 
definition of medical “devices.”125 In fact, Commissioner Gottlieb’s 
announcement itself acknowledged that the FDA might not have clear statutory 
authority to introduce the third-party precertification program.126 And an October 
2018 letter from three senators to the FDA questioned the FDA’s statutory 
authority for creating a precertification program, for using “phased” or 
“conditional” approvals, and for using third-party reviews.127 
On the other hand, Congress repeatedly directs the FDA to use the least 
burdensome approach to reviewing medical devices,128 and these experiments 
would seem to be in precisely that spirit. Of course, a “least burdensome” 
approach would have to be within statutory bounds¾which is questionable at 
best. In the end, if the FDA’s experiments show some success, it is not 
inconceivable that the agency could convince Congress to codify its practices by 
statute¾something the agency has a track record of achieving.129 In that case, 
resolving the foregoing issues will go a long way toward convincing skeptics that 
these experiments with medical product regulation are superior to the FDA’s 
longstanding (but decidedly less exciting) approach. 
V. MOVING FORWARD 
Instead of a traditional conclusion, let me offer some thoughts on how to 
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move forward. The FDA’s new plans for digital health should be viewed as 
experiments with medical product regulation, and should be evaluated as such. 
What data and substantiation should we require of digital health products before 
they hit the market, and how do we best preserve developer incentives to 
generate reliable data regarding safety and efficacy after products are on the 
market? Will third-party certifiers provide meaningful review? Will firm-level 
characteristics be a better proxy than product-level characteristics in predicting 
how useful and reliable digital health products are? If shortcomings become 
apparent, how will the new framework adapt? And will the FDA use hard law 
backstops such as de-certification, product withdrawals, and traditional 
regulatory enforcement (such as adulteration and misbranding actions) when, 
inevitably, problems do occur? Finally, how does the new framework compare 
with the old? 
The tone of this article might suggest that these experiments are not 
worthwhile¾which could not be further from the truth. The FDA’s medical 
device framework has yellowed with time, and the FDA is taking bold moves to 
adapt its old framework to very new products in the absence of genuine 
congressional intervention. But hopefully these bold experiments will not calcify 
into a weak default approach that lingers for decades, as the FDA’s 1987 and 
1989 draft guidances on software did.130 There are lessons to be learned from that 
tentative approach,131 if we chose to heed them. Now is the time to evaluate the 
FDA’s experiments as experiments. 
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